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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Clyde Owen Dixey appeals from the district court's order summarily
dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of Prior Post-Conviction Proceedings
The facts and course of proceedings relating to Dixey's first postconviction action are as set forth by the district court in its order granting the
state's motion for summary dismissal:
1.
In August of 2007, Dixey was tried by jury and found guilty of
two counts of Burglary, both being felonies.
Attorney Cindy
Campbell represented Dixey at trial.
2.
Attorney Kevin Peterson substituted in as Dixey's counsel of
record prior to sentencing.
3.
Dixey was sentenced to a fixed and determinate period of
four (4) years, together with an indeterminate period of four (4)
years (not less than four years nor more than eight (8) years) on
each count, with the sentences to run concurrently.
Dixey's
sentence was suspended and Dixey was placed on probation for a
period of five (5) years.
4.
Dixey later admitted to violating the terms of his probation
and his probation was modified.
5.
Dixey admitted to violating the terms of his modified
probation.
His probation was revoked, his sentence was
reimposed, and his sentence was suspended. The Court retained
jurisdiction. Attorney Kevin Peterson continued to represent Dixey
through the revocation of his probation.
6.
Upon receipt of the Addendum to the Presentence
Investigation from the North Idaho Correctional Institution, the
Court, on May 28, 2009, relinquished jurisdiction and reimposed
Dixey's original sentence.
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7.
On October 19, 2009, attorney Kevin Peterson was allowed
to withdraw as Dixey's counsel of record.
Attorney Manuel
Murdoch was appointed in Kevin Peterson's place.
8.
Dixey did not appeal his conviction or sentence, but he did
file a motion for sentence reduction. Dixey's motion for sentence
reduction was denied. Dixey did not appeal the denial of his
sentence reduction motion.
9.
On November 18, 2008, Dixey filed his original petition for
post-conviction relief. He amended his petition twice before it was
adjudicated.
10.
On December 13, 2010, this Court denied all of Dixey's
ineffective assistance of counsel claims save for one: post-trial
counsel's failure to timely appeal Dixey's conviction.
11.
Dixey's judgment of conviction for Burglary was affirmed on
appeal.
(R., pp.97-99 (footnotes omitted).)

Statement of Facts and Course of Successive Post-Conviction Proceedings
Dixey filed a pro se successive petition for post-conviction relief in
December of 2011. (R., pp.4-16.) In it, Dixey raised seven separate issues of
ineffective assistance of counsel which he asserted were not properly raised in
his initial petition for post-conviction relief, including a claim post-conviction
counsel had been ineffective in presenting a claim that trial counsel had failed to
investigate alternative perpetrator evidence related to the truck used in the
burglaries.

(R., pp.5-7.)

Although the district court appointed Dixey post-

conviction counsel (R., pp.61-62), there was no amended petition filed on Dixey's
behalf.
The state file a motion for summary disposition asserting "the claims were
not inadequately raised" and Dixey was "simply try[ing] to reargue the claim[s]."
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(R., p.73.) At a hearing on the motion for summary dismissal, Dixey conceded all

but the issue relating to the ineffectiveness of counsel for failing to adequately
present his alternate suspect evidence at trial. (R., p.96; Tr., p.12, L.7 - p.21,
L.10.) The state argued at hearing that Dixey's claims in his successive petition
for post-conviction relief were barred because they should have been raised in
his initial petition. (Tr., p.22, Ls.4-7.)
Following a hearing on the state's motion, the court issued a written
decision granting summary disposition finding "Dixey's alibi defense was
previously raised in his original post-conviction petition" and that "Dixey waived
his ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel claim with regard to
ownership of the grey truck." (R., p.106.)
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ISSUE
Dixey states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Dixey's
successive petition for post-conviction relief because he presented
an issue of material fact as to whether post-conviction counseled
[sic] was ineffective for failing to present and support his claim that
trial counsel should have corroborated that Mr. Dixey did not own
the pickup and that the pickup's owner fit the description of the
perpetrator of the September 2006 incident?
(Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Dixey failed to establish that the district court erred by summarily
dismissing his successive post-conviction petition?
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ARGUMENT
Dixey Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred By Summarily
Dismissing His Successive Post-Conviction Petition
A.

Introduction
The district court dismissed Dixey's successive petition, finding Dixey

failed to raise, in his original petition, the issue of whether trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to gather evidence regarding ownership of the vehicle used
in the burglaries and did not show why that issue was not raised in his initial
petition for post-conviction relief. (R., p.106.) The district court further found in
dismissing Dixey's petition that he had previously raised in his original petition a
claim counsel was ineffective in presenting an alibi defense. (Id.) The district
court concluded Dixey failed to raise a material issue of fact regarding either
issue and granted the state's motion to summarily dismiss Dixey's successive
petition for post-conviction relief. (Id.) On appeal, Dixey claims "[t]he issues Mr.
Dixey raised in the successive petition concerning the pickup's previous owner
were not presented during Mr. Dixey's initial post-conviction action." (Appellant's
brief, p.12.) Dixey also asserts that he did present "an issue of fact justifying an
evidentiary hearing as to whether post-conviction counsel's ineffective assistance
present[ed] sufficient reason to permit litigation the claim in a successive petition"
by informing "post-conviction counsel that trial counsel failed to corroborate that
he did not own the pickup in question during September 2006 and failed to
present evidence that the pickup's previous owner matched the description of the
suspect." (Appellant's brief, pp.15-16.) Dixey's arguments are without merit.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court's

application of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State,
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001).

On appeal from summary

dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court reviews the record to
determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v.
State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State,
132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely
review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Edwards v. Conchemco,
Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852,727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986).

C.

Dismissal Of Dixey's Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Was
Appropriate
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil

proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing,

by a

preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).

However, a petition for post-conviction

relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain
more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a
complaint.

Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing I.R.C.P.

8). The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and
produce admissible evidence to support his allegations . .kl (citing I.C. § 19-
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4903).

Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application

must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary
hearing.

Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982);

Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,684,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application
for post-conviction relief when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine
issue of material fact, which if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the
applicant to the requested relief.

Downing v. State, 132 Idaho 861, 863, 979

P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct. App. 1999); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892
P.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995). Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(c), a district court may
dismiss a post-conviction application on the motion of any party when it appears
that the applicant is not entitled to relief. Specifically, I.C. § 19-4906(c) provides:
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary
disposition of the application when it appears from the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and
agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Applying these principles in this case, the district court summarily
dismissed Dixey's petition as being improperly successive.

(R., pp.95-106.)

Contrary to Dixey's assertions on appeal, a review of the record and the
applicable law supports the district court's order of summary dismissal.
Dixey's petition was correctly dismissed on the basis that it failed to satisfy
the criteria for a permissible successive petition under the UPCPA. Idaho Code
§ 19-4908 governs the filing of successive petitions and provides:
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Waiver of or failure to assert claims. - All grounds for relief
available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his
original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally
adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction
or sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to
secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application,
unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for
sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in
the original, supplemental, or amended application.
I.C. § 19-4908.

In interpreting this statute, Idaho's appellate courts have held

that "[i]neffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel may provide
sufficient reason for permitting newly asserted allegations or allegations
inadequately raised in the initial application to be raised in a subsequent postconviction application." Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400,
403 (Ct. App. 2008) (footnote omitted) (citing Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591,
596, 635 P.2d 955, 960 (1981); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992
P.2d 789, 793 (Ct. App. 1999)). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel,
however, a post-conviction petitioner must demonstrate both that (a) his
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
(b) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the
proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88 (1984).
Although Dixey argues otherwise, a review of the record shows that Dixey
had previously raised the issue of his alibi evidence in his first petition for postconviction relief. Further, Dixey has failed to explain why he did not argue the
ownership of the vehicle issue in his first petition. As such, Dixey has failed to
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establish a "sufficient reason" to justify the filing of his successive petition in this
case.
Dixey raised in his original petition for post-conviction relief the claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present his alibi defense.
Subsequent to the prose filing of his original petition, counsel was appointed and
filed additional documents, including a second amended petition for post
conviction relief which included the claim "Petitioner does not feel like his
attorney asked him adequate questions while he was on the stand to allow him to
adequately present his side of the story while testifying, nor did she ask the
questions that he wanted her to ask the witnesses." (6/19/2013 Augmentation to
the Record, Second Amended Post Conviction Petition, p.5.) Also filed was a
response to the state's third motion for summary disposition which included the
following summary of Dixey's alibi:
In paragraph 9 of Respondent's motion, Respondent states
that "Petitioner claims that his counsel did not ask him enough
questions at trial." This is an inaccurate statement of Petitioner's
In paragraph 9 of Petitioner's Second Amended
allegation.
Petition, Petitioner states that he "does not feel like his attorney
asked him adequate questions while he was on the stand to allow
him to adequately present his side of the story while testifying ... ".
Petitioner alleges the following facts to show that there is a material
question of fact to be resolved by the court at an evidentiary
hearing. Petitioner responds that Cindy Campbell cut him off
during his testimony and instructed him to only answer the
questions asked. This prevented him from explaining to the jury
that he wasn't in Blackfoot during the incident of September 29,
2006. He wanted to explain to the jury that he had just been placed
on misdemeanor probation and was starting school at I.S.U.; that
between his court dates, looking for a place to live and looking for a
vehicle, he didn't have time to run around Blackfoot to be accused
of stealing.
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(6/19/2013 Augmentation to the Record, Petitioner's Response to Respondent's
Third Motion for Summary Disposition, p.4.)

Dixey raised the issue that his

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an alibi defense in his second
amended petition for post-conviction relief and specifically addressed the claim in
his response to the state's motion for summary disposition through his assertion
that counsel failed to allow him to explain to the jury he could not have been
present at the location of the first burglary offense because he was busy
elsewhere. As such, this claim was raised in Dixey's amended petition for postconviction relief and cannot now be asserted in a successive petition for postconviction relief. Even if trial counsel had elicited the testimony detailed above
by Dixey, such evidence does not establish an alibi for the September burglary.
(See R., p.104.)
Dixey further asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate and present evidence at trial that he did not own the vehicle in
question at the time the first burglary was committed and that the person who did
bore a resemblance to himself. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-17.) Dixey does not,
however, provide a reason for his failure to include this claim in his initial petition
for post-conviction relief.

The information of ownership of the grey truck in

question and the physical attributes of the person from whom he obtained the
vehicle was known to Dixey at the time of the filing of the original petition for
post-conviction relief. Dixey provides no reason for his failure to raise this issue
in his first petition.

In granting the state's motion for summary disposition, the

district court found:
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Dixey argues that he did not purchase or drive the vehicle,
identified at the crime scene, until late October of 2006 and that he
gave this information to his trial attorney. Nowhere in Dixey's
original petition, the two amendments thereto, or his affidavit in
response to the State's motion for summary disposition did Dixie
[sic] ever mention trial counsel's alleged failure to raise this issue at
trial.
Dixie [sic] knew this information by the conclusion of his
August 23, 2007 jury trial. Furthermore, a transcript of the jury trial
was filed in his original post-conviction case on October 6, 2009.
Thus, prior to Dixey's amended petition and affidavit, his second
amended petition and affidavit, and his affidavit in response to the
State's motion for summary disposition, Dixey had a full transcript
of what happened at his jury trial. The transcript provided concrete
proof of the evidence trial counsel did, or did not, elicit.
Dixey gives no reason for his failure to raise the issue in his
first post-conviction petition. He does, however, attach the affidavit
of Yank Hensley, wherein Mr. Hensley attests that Michael
Crumbley used the 1977 grey primer Chevy short box pickup truck
on a regular basis in September of 2006. In a separate affidavit,
Mr. Hensley testifies that he informed Dixey in mid-October 2006
that the Crumbleys wished to sell their grey Chevy truck. He then
testifies that he observed Dixey with the truck on October 26, 2006.
Dixey offers no explanation why this information was not
available to him in November of 2008, when he filed his original,
prose post-conviction petition; in November of 2009 when, together
with his appointed attorney, he file his amended petition and an
affidavit; in May of 2010 when he and his attorney filed his
seconded [sic] amended petition and affidavit; or in October of 2010
when he and his attorney responded to the State's motion for
summary disposition and filed an affidavit.
(R., pp.104-105 (footnotes omitted).)
The district court correctly dismissed Dixey's petition on the ground that it
did not meet the statutory requirements for a permissible successive petition
under I.C. § 19-4908 as the record supports the district court's finding that Dixey
raised the alibi issue in his first post-conviction relief action, and he failed to
establish a sufficient reason why the issue of ownership of the vehicle used in the
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commission of the first burglary was not raised in Dixey's original post-conviction
relief action, thus failing to make a substantial factual showing as to the
ineffectiveness of his post-conviction counsel.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order summarily dismissing Dixey's successive petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 20 th day of August, 201-3_._

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of August, 2013, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
ROBYN FYFFE
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
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